Arbeitspapier
Motives of sanctioning: Equity and emotions in a public good experiment with punishment
We study conditional cooperation based on a sequential two-person linear public good game in which a trusting first contributor can be exploited by a second contributor. After playing this game the first contributor is allowed to punish the second contributor. The consequences of sanctioning depend on the treatment: whereas punishment can reduce inequality in one treatment, it only creates another inequality in the other. To capture the effect of delay on punishment both treatments are run once with immediate and once with delayed punishment. Moreover, to investigate the effect of pure voice, all four treatments are also run in a virtual condition with no monetary consequences of punishment. Results show the emergence across all conditions of a strong norm of conditional cooperation. Punishment is generally low, it is higher when not delayed and it is not used to reduce inequality in payoffs. The main motive of sanctioning appears to be the need to punish a violation of the reciprocity norm, irrespective of monetary consequences.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2012,046
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
- Thema
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Public good games
Punishment
Experiments
Conditional cooperation
Extensives Spiel
Öffentliches Gut
Strafe
Kooperation
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Crosetto, Paolo
Güth, Werner
Mittone, Luigi
Ploner, Matteo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Crosetto, Paolo
- Güth, Werner
- Mittone, Luigi
- Ploner, Matteo
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2012