Value bounds and best response violations in discriminatory share auctions

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes a discriminatory share auction in which bidders submit non-increasing step functions with a bounded number of steps, the type space consists of private non-increasing marginal valuation functions, and the number of participants is random. I show that the interim utility can be written as a simple functional of the distribution of the allocated quantity. This allows me to derive equilibrium existence and to give a characterization of the equilibrium bid schedules in terms of the individual bidders' optimality conditions. The characterization facilitates the formulation of bounds on the estimates of marginal valuations between the submitted quantity points and permits a simple estimator of the fraction of best response violations among the submitted bids. Proofs of concept for the bounds and the estimator are given by using a novel data set from meat import quota auctions in Switzerland.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: WWZ Working Paper ; No. 2015/14

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Econometrics of Games and Auctions
• Thema: Discriminatory Share Auctions ; Random Participation ; Estimation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Häfner, Samuel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5451/unibas-ep77454
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/156493
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ