Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply - Experimental Evidence

Arbeitspapier

In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Somewhat surprisingly but again predicted by theory, it also yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it the more efficient auction format.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 460

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Subject: auctions ; experiment ; discriminatory ; uniform ; Auktionstheorie ; Preisdifferenzierung ; Test ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Damianov, Damian S. ; Oechssler, Jörg ; Becker, Johannes Gerd
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
• (where): Heidelberg
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127280
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET