Arbeitspapier
Goals (th)at work: Goals, monetary incentives, and workers' performance
In a randomized field experiment, we investigate the connection between work goals, monetary incentives, and work performance. Employees are observed in a natural work environment where they have to do a simple, but effort-intense task. Output is perfectly observable and workers are paid for performance. While a regular piece-rate contract serves as a benchmark, in some treatments workers are paid a bonus conditional on reaching a pre-specified goal. We observe that the use of personal work goals leads to a significant output increase. The positive effect of goals not only prevails if they are self-chosen by the workers, but also if goals are set exogenously by the principal - although in the latter case, the exact size of the goal plays a crucial role. Strikingly, the positive effect of self-chosen goals persists even if the goal is not backed up by monetary incentives. We propose a novel incentive contract where - through the choice of a personal work goal - workers themselves determine the risk and the size of their bonus payment at the same time.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2012/19
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
Field Experiments
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
-
Goal setting
monetary incentives
bonus payments
pay-for-performance contracts
workplace behavior
field experiment
Leistungsentgelt
Akkordlohn
Betriebswirtschaftliches Ziel
Arbeitsleistung
Feldforschung
Deutschland
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Goerg, Sebastian J.
Kube, Sebastian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Goerg, Sebastian J.
- Kube, Sebastian
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2012