Arbeitspapier

Goals (th)at work: Goals, monetary incentives, and workers' performance

In a randomized field experiment, we investigate the connection between work goals, monetary incentives, and work performance. Employees are observed in a natural work environment where they have to do a simple, but effort-intense task. Output is perfectly observable and workers are paid for performance. While a regular piece-rate contract serves as a benchmark, in some treatments workers are paid a bonus conditional on reaching a pre-specified goal. We observe that the use of personal work goals leads to a significant output increase. The positive effect of goals not only prevails if they are self-chosen by the workers, but also if goals are set exogenously by the principal - although in the latter case, the exact size of the goal plays a crucial role. Strikingly, the positive effect of self-chosen goals persists even if the goal is not backed up by monetary incentives. We propose a novel incentive contract where - through the choice of a personal work goal - workers themselves determine the risk and the size of their bonus payment at the same time.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2012/19

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
Field Experiments
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Thema
Goal setting
monetary incentives
bonus payments
pay-for-performance contracts
workplace behavior
field experiment
Leistungsentgelt
Akkordlohn
Betriebswirtschaftliches Ziel
Arbeitsleistung
Feldforschung
Deutschland

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Goerg, Sebastian J.
Kube, Sebastian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Goerg, Sebastian J.
  • Kube, Sebastian
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2012

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