Arbeitspapier

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

In the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with two groups of individual players who move sequentially, only the player with the lowest effort cost has a positive payoff. This payoff and the overall dissipation crucially depend on group composition.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 06-01

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Subject
Sequential all-pay auction
complete information
generalized cost
generalized Stackelberg game

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Konrad, Kai A.
Leininger, Wolfgang
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Universität Dortmund, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
(where)
Dortmund
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Leininger, Wolfgang
  • Universität Dortmund, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät

Time of origin

  • 2006

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