Arbeitspapier
Approximate Results for a Generalized Secretary Problem
A version of the classical secretary problem is studied, in which one is interested in selecting one of the b best out of a group of n differently ranked persons who are presented one by one in a random order. It is assumed that b is bigger than or equal to 1 is a preassigned number. It is known, already for a long time, that for the optimal policy one needs to compute b position thresholds, for instance via backwards induction. In this paper we study approximate policies, that use just a single or a double position threshold, albeit in conjunction with a level rank. We give exact and asymptotic (as n goes to infinity) results, which show that the double-level policy is an extremely accurate approximation.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-092/4
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling: General
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- Thema
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Secretary Problem
Dynamic Programming
Approximate Policies
Mathematische Optimierung
Suchtheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Dietz, Chris
van der Laan, Dinard
Ridder, Ad
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dietz, Chris
- van der Laan, Dinard
- Ridder, Ad
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2010