Arbeitspapier

Approximate Results for a Generalized Secretary Problem

A version of the classical secretary problem is studied, in which one is interested in selecting one of the b best out of a group of n differently ranked persons who are presented one by one in a random order. It is assumed that b is bigger than or equal to 1 is a preassigned number. It is known, already for a long time, that for the optimal policy one needs to compute b position thresholds, for instance via backwards induction. In this paper we study approximate policies, that use just a single or a double position threshold, albeit in conjunction with a level rank. We give exact and asymptotic (as n goes to infinity) results, which show that the double-level policy is an extremely accurate approximation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-092/4

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling: General
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Thema
Secretary Problem
Dynamic Programming
Approximate Policies
Mathematische Optimierung
Suchtheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dietz, Chris
van der Laan, Dinard
Ridder, Ad
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dietz, Chris
  • van der Laan, Dinard
  • Ridder, Ad
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2010

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