Social norms, third-party observation and third-party reward

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines the influence of third-party observation and third-party reward on behavior in an experimental prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. Whereas the existing literature on third-party intervention as a means to sustain social norms has dealt almost exclusively with third-party punishment, we show that both third-party observation and third-party reward have positive effects on cooperation rates, compared to a treatment where no third party is involved. Third-party reward is more effective in increasing cooperation than third-party observation. However, rewards are given too late to prevent a steady downward trend of cooperation rates.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2009-08

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Thema: Social norms ; third-party reward ; third-party observation ; prisoner?s dilemma experiment ; Soziale Norm ; Gefangenendilemma ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Sutter, Matthias ; Lindner, Peter ; Platsch, Daniela
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
• (wo): Innsbruck
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73488
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ