Social norms, third-party observation and third-party reward

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines the influence of third-party observation and third-party reward on behavior in an experimental prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. Whereas the existing literature on third-party intervention as a means to sustain social norms has dealt almost exclusively with third-party punishment, we show that both third-party observation and third-party reward have positive effects on cooperation rates, compared to a treatment where no third party is involved. Third-party reward is more effective in increasing cooperation than third-party observation. However, rewards are given too late to prevent a steady downward trend of cooperation rates.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2009-08

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Subject: Social norms ; third-party reward ; third-party observation ; prisoner?s dilemma experiment ; Soziale Norm ; Gefangenendilemma ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Sutter, Matthias ; Lindner, Peter ; Platsch, Daniela
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
• (where): Innsbruck
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73488
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET