Arbeitspapier
The dos and don'ts of leadership in sequential public goods experiments
We study the effects of leadership in the provision of public goods by examining (i) the relative importance of reward and punishment as leadership devices, (ii) whether endogenous leadership is more efficient than exogenously enforced leadership, and (iii) whether leaders contributing last, instead of first, also increase contributions. The experimental results are: (i) Reward options yield lower contributions than punishment through exclusion. (ii) Endogenous leadership is much more efficient than exogenously imposed leadership. (iii) Sequentiality itself is not beneficial for contributions since groups where the leader contributes as the last member do not contribute more than groups without a leader.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2008-25
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
- Thema
-
public goods experiment
leadership
exclusion power
reward
endogeneity
Öffentliches Gut
Kooperatives Spiel
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Rivas, Maria Fernanda
Sutter, Matthias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
- (wo)
-
Innsbruck
- (wann)
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2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Rivas, Maria Fernanda
- Sutter, Matthias
- University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
Entstanden
- 2008