Arbeitspapier
The dos and don'ts of leadership in sequential public goods experiments
We study the effects of leadership in the provision of public goods by examining (i) the relative importance of reward and punishment as leadership devices, (ii) whether endogenous leadership is more efficient than exogenously enforced leadership, and (iii) whether leaders contributing last, instead of first, also increase contributions. The experimental results are: (i) Reward options yield lower contributions than punishment through exclusion. (ii) Endogenous leadership is much more efficient than exogenously imposed leadership. (iii) Sequentiality itself is not beneficial for contributions since groups where the leader contributes as the last member do not contribute more than groups without a leader.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2008-25
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
- Subject
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public goods experiment
leadership
exclusion power
reward
endogeneity
Öffentliches Gut
Kooperatives Spiel
Test
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Rivas, Maria Fernanda
Sutter, Matthias
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
- (where)
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Innsbruck
- (when)
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2008
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Rivas, Maria Fernanda
- Sutter, Matthias
- University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
Time of origin
- 2008