The dos and don'ts of leadership in sequential public goods experiments

Arbeitspapier

We study the effects of leadership in the provision of public goods by examining (i) the relative importance of reward and punishment as leadership devices, (ii) whether endogenous leadership is more efficient than exogenously enforced leadership, and (iii) whether leaders contributing last, instead of first, also increase contributions. The experimental results are: (i) Reward options yield lower contributions than punishment through exclusion. (ii) Endogenous leadership is much more efficient than exogenously imposed leadership. (iii) Sequentiality itself is not beneficial for contributions since groups where the leader contributes as the last member do not contribute more than groups without a leader.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2008-25

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Public Goods
• Subject: public goods experiment ; leadership ; exclusion power ; reward ; endogeneity ; Öffentliches Gut ; Kooperatives Spiel ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Rivas, Maria Fernanda ; Sutter, Matthias
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
• (where): Innsbruck
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71935
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET