Arbeitspapier

The dos and don'ts of leadership in sequential public goods experiments

We study the effects of leadership in the provision of public goods by examining (i) the relative importance of reward and punishment as leadership devices, (ii) whether endogenous leadership is more efficient than exogenously enforced leadership, and (iii) whether leaders contributing last, instead of first, also increase contributions. The experimental results are: (i) Reward options yield lower contributions than punishment through exclusion. (ii) Endogenous leadership is much more efficient than exogenously imposed leadership. (iii) Sequentiality itself is not beneficial for contributions since groups where the leader contributes as the last member do not contribute more than groups without a leader.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2008-25

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
Thema
public goods experiment
leadership
exclusion power
reward
endogeneity
Öffentliches Gut
Kooperatives Spiel
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Rivas, Maria Fernanda
Sutter, Matthias
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
(wo)
Innsbruck
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Rivas, Maria Fernanda
  • Sutter, Matthias
  • University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance

Entstanden

  • 2008

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