Artikel

Bayesian games with a continuum of states

We show that every Bayesian game with purely atomic types has a measurable Bayesian equilibrium when the common knowledge relation is smooth. Conversely, for any common knowledge relation that is not smooth, there exists a type space that yields this common knowledge relation and payoffs such that the resulting Bayesian game does not have any Bayesian equilibrium. We show that our smoothness condition also rules out two paradoxes involving Bayesian games with a continuum of types: the impossibility of having a common prior on components when a common prior over the entire state space exists, and the possibility of interim betting/trade even when no such trade can be supported ex ante.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1089-1120 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Thema
Bayesian games
Bayesian equilibrium
common priors
continuum of states

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hellman, Ziv
Levy, Yehuda John
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2017

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1544
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Hellman, Ziv
  • Levy, Yehuda John
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2017

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