Artikel
Bayesian games with a continuum of states
We show that every Bayesian game with purely atomic types has a measurable Bayesian equilibrium when the common knowledge relation is smooth. Conversely, for any common knowledge relation that is not smooth, there exists a type space that yields this common knowledge relation and payoffs such that the resulting Bayesian game does not have any Bayesian equilibrium. We show that our smoothness condition also rules out two paradoxes involving Bayesian games with a continuum of types: the impossibility of having a common prior on components when a common prior over the entire state space exists, and the possibility of interim betting/trade even when no such trade can be supported ex ante.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1089-1120 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
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Bayesian games
Bayesian equilibrium
common priors
continuum of states
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Hellman, Ziv
Levy, Yehuda John
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New Haven, CT
- (wann)
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2017
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE1544
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Hellman, Ziv
- Levy, Yehuda John
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2017