Arbeitspapier

Equilibrium in Non-Partitioning Strategies

Herein we present a single example with three purposes: (1) to show the existence of equilibria in a game which violates the assumptions of currently-available general existence theorems, (2) to illustrate the importance of the "affiliation" assumption in economic games of incomplete information, by showing how even a slight relaxation can lead to the nonexistence of equilibria in monotone strategies, and, most importantly, (3) to exhibit an equilibrium point in strategies which partially reveal information without inducing posterior partitionings of the players' type spaces.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 929

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Weber, Robert J.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(where)
Evanston, IL
(when)
1991

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Weber, Robert J.
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Time of origin

  • 1991

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