Arbeitspapier

Finite memory distributed systems

A distributed system model is studied, where individual agents play repeatedly against each other and change their strategies based upon previous play. It is shown how to model this environment in terms of continuous population densities of agent types. A complication arises because the population densities of different strategies depend upon each other not only through game payoffs, but also through the strategy distributions themselves. In spite of this, it is shown that when an agent imitates the strategy of his previous opponent at a sufficiently high rate, the system of equations which governs the dynamical evolution of agent populations can be reduced to one equation for the total population. In a sense, the dynamics 'collapse' to the dynamics of the entire system taken as a whole, which describes the behavior of all types of agents. We explore the implications of this model, and present both analytical and simulation results.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 190

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Thema
fixed strategy
prisoner's dilemma
Fokker-Plank
distributed system
Gefangenendilemma
Wiederholte Spiele

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dorofeenko, Viktor
Shorish, Jamsheed
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
(wo)
Vienna
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dorofeenko, Viktor
  • Shorish, Jamsheed
  • Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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