- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1432-1270
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
online resource.
- Erschienen in
-
On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals ; volume:49 ; number:4 ; day:17 ; month:11 ; year:2020 ; pages:1059-1080 ; date:12.2020
International journal of game theory ; 49, Heft 4 (17.11.2020), 1059-1080, 12.2020
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s00182-020-00728-y
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021010518542209628338
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:37 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Klaus, Bettina
- Protopapas, Panos
- SpringerLink (Online service)
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Coarse median algebras: the intrinsic geometry of coarse median spaces and their intervals
Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
Prudence Versus Sophistication in Voting Strategy
Strategic voting over strategic proposals
Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond
A foundation for dominant strategy voting mechanisms
Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
Voting over law enforcement: Mission impossible
Generalization of the Lehmer problem over incomplete intervals
Mathematics and politics : strategy, voting, power and proof
The Existence of a Strategy Proof Voting Procedure
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
Coarse median algebras: the intrinsic geometry of coarse median spaces and their intervals
Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
Prudence Versus Sophistication in Voting Strategy
Strategic voting over strategic proposals
Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond
A foundation for dominant strategy voting mechanisms
Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
Voting over law enforcement: Mission impossible
Generalization of the Lehmer problem over incomplete intervals
Mathematics and politics : strategy, voting, power and proof
The Existence of a Strategy Proof Voting Procedure
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
Coarse median algebras: the intrinsic geometry of coarse median spaces and their intervals
Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
Prudence Versus Sophistication in Voting Strategy
Strategic voting over strategic proposals
Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond
A foundation for dominant strategy voting mechanisms
Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
Voting over law enforcement: Mission impossible
Generalization of the Lehmer problem over incomplete intervals
Mathematics and politics : strategy, voting, power and proof
The Existence of a Strategy Proof Voting Procedure