- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 42
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Satterthwaite, Mark Allen
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1973
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1973
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
Mathematics and politics : strategy, voting, power and proof
Anonymity proof voting rules
Strategy-Proof Exchange
Strategy-Proof Package Assignment
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms
Strategy Proofness and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: Existence and Equivalence Theorems for Voting Procedures
Proof of the Existence of Speculative Equilibria
Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages
Strategy-Proofness: The Existence of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and CorrespondenceTheorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions
Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
Mathematics and politics : strategy, voting, power and proof
Anonymity proof voting rules
Strategy-Proof Exchange
Strategy-Proof Package Assignment
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms
Strategy Proofness and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: Existence and Equivalence Theorems for Voting Procedures
Proof of the Existence of Speculative Equilibria
Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages
Strategy-Proofness: The Existence of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and CorrespondenceTheorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions
Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
Mathematics and politics : strategy, voting, power and proof
Anonymity proof voting rules
Strategy-Proof Exchange
Strategy-Proof Package Assignment
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms
Strategy Proofness and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: Existence and Equivalence Theorems for Voting Procedures
Proof of the Existence of Speculative Equilibria
Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages
Strategy-Proofness: The Existence of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms