Strategic Self-Ignorance

Arbeitspapier

We examine strategic self-ignorance—the use of ignorance as an excuse to over-indulge in pleasurable activities that may be harmful to one's future self. Our model shows that guilt aversion provides a behavioral rationale for present-biased agents to avoid information about negative future impacts of such activities. We then confront our model with data from an experiment using prepared, restaurant-style meals—a good that is transparent in immediate pleasure (taste) but non-transparent in future harm (calories). Our results support the notion that strategic self-ignorance matters: nearly three of five subjects (58 percent) chose to ignore free information on calorie content, leading at-risk subjects to consume significantly more calories. We also find evidence consistent with our model on the determinants of strategic self-ignorance.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2013:17

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: Experiment ; Information ; Ignorance

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Thunström, Linda ; Nordström, Jonas ; Shogren, Jason F. ; Ehmke, Mariah ; van 't Veld, Klaas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (where): Lund
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/260075
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET