Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance

Arbeitspapier

Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can find out about this cost ahead of the volunteering game, a strategic value is attached to the information, and individuals may prefer not to learn their cost of provision. If the time horizon is sufficiently short, in equilibrium only one individual may acquire information about his cost. For a long time horizon, acquiring information is strictly dominant. The time limit is an important instrument in influencing the efficiency of the volunteering game.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2010-17

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Public Goods ; Auctions ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: War of attrition ; volunteering ; discrete public goods ; asymmetric information ; information acquisition

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Morath, Florian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54584
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET