Arbeitspapier

Efficiency wages in a Cournot-oligopoly

In a Cournot-oligopoly with free but costly entry and business stealing, output per firm is too low and the number of competitors excessive, assuming labor productivity to depend on the number of employees only or to be constant. However, a firm can raise the productivity of its workforce by paying higher wages. We show that such efficiency wages accentuate the distortions occurring in oligopoly. Specifically, excessive entry is aggravated and the welfare loss due to market power rises.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 07/2018

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subject
Oligopoly
Efficiency Wages
Excessive Entry
Welfare

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
De Pinto, Marco
Goerke, Laszlo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)
(where)
Trier
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • De Pinto, Marco
  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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