Arbeitspapier
Outside directors on the board, competition and innovation
We investigate the influence of non-executive outside directors on firms' innovative performance for a sample of 1,393 listed firms in the EU - 15 member states plus Norway and Switzerland in the period 2005 to 2010. Our results show that the fraction of non-executive outside directors on the board is associated with a significant decrease in the number of patent applications if competition in the market is low. This may indicate that restrictive monitoring and lower advising competences of outside directors mitigate executives' incentives to innovate. In industries with effective competition, the negative influence of outsiders is offset by the pressure to focus on innovation strategies.
- ISBN
-
978-3-86304-172-4
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 173
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
Business Economics
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- Thema
-
Competition
Corporate Governance
Innovation
Patents
Board Composition
Outside Directors
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Buchwald, Achim
Thorwarth, Susanne
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wo)
-
Düsseldorf
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Buchwald, Achim
- Thorwarth, Susanne
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2015