Arbeitspapier

Boards: Independent and Committed Directors?

Regulators and shareholders are calling for independent directors. Independent directors, however, have numerous external professional commitments. Using To- bin's Q as an approximation of market valuation and controlling for endogeneity, our empirical analysis reveals that neither external commitments are negatively related to firm performance nor is independence positively related to it. However, more precise analyses show that executive directors and family representatives have a positive relationship with Tobin's Q. In contrast, external executives are negatively correlated with firm valuation. Moreover, the study indicates that the frequency and duration of meetings are negatively affected by the fraction of executive directors on the board. Insiders potentially reduce the need for meetings because of their specialist competence. The results invalidate rules advocating independent directors and oppose the engagement of directors with external commitments.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WWZ Discussion Paper ; No. 2011/12

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Business and Securities Law
Thema
Corporate governance: Board of directors
Board independence
Board busyness
External commitments
Corporate Governance
Board of Directors
Eigentümerstruktur
Unternehmenswert
Tobins Q
Schweiz

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gantenbein, Pascal
Volonté, Christophe
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2011

DOI
doi:10.5451/unibas-ep61215
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gantenbein, Pascal
  • Volonté, Christophe
  • University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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