Arbeitspapier
Job assignments under moral hazard: the Peter Principle revisited
The Peter Principle captures two stylized facts about hierarchies: first, promotions often place employees into jobs for which they are less well suited than for that previously held. Second, demotions are extremely rare. Why do organizations not correct 'wrong' promotion decision? This paper shows in a complete contracting setting that a simple trade-off between incentive provision and efficient job assignment may make it optimal to promote some employees to a job at which they produce less than they would at the previous level.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2973
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Erwerbsverlauf
Anforderungsprofil
Moral Hazard
Leistungsanreiz
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Koch, Alexander K.
Nafziger, Julia
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2007
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Koch, Alexander K.
- Nafziger, Julia
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2007
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The Duration of Trade Revisited: Continuous-Time vs. Discrete-Time Hazards
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Job Assignments, Intrinsic Motivation and Explicit Incentives
Overlapping Multiple Assignments
Introduction: Job satisfaction revisited
Classroom epigraphy assignments with Perseids
Who benefits from homework assignments?
Scheduling jobs on uniform processors revisited
The principle of minimum differentiation revisited: Return of the median voter
The Duration of Trade Revisited: Continuous-Time vs. Discrete-Time Hazards
Rating assignments : lessons from international banks
Managing inpatriation : making assignments more effective