Tax Competition, the Distribution of MNE's Ownership and the Wage Formation Process

Arbeitspapier

This paper shows how the distribution of the ownership of multinational companies and the labour market conditions, especially the wage formation process, influence the outcome of interjurisdictional tax competition and coordination. In particular, it sets forth that equilibrium corporate tax rate can be negative, being a subsidy to the mobile factor, financed through a tax on the immobile one, and that foreign ownership of companies enables a jurisdiction which behaves non-cooperatively to export its tax burden through a too large tax rate on profits on its territory.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 631

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: tax competition ; tax coordination ; multinational firm ; foreign ownership ; labour market ; wage formation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gérard, Marcel
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75906
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET