Subsidy Competition and the Role of Firm Ownership

Arbeitspapier

This paper addresses the role that foreign vs. domestic ownership of companies plays for governments in asymmetric countries' competition for a multinational's subsidiary. I argue that equilibrium subsidies as well as a foreign investor's location decision in policy competition between these countries critically depend on the ownership structure of incumbent firms. This shows that small countries with few national incumbents in an industry may be successful in attracting multinationals.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2007-31

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT) ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: Subsidy competition ; foreign direct investment ; regional location ; Subvention ; Standortpolitik ; Standortwettbewerb ; Multinationales Unternehmen ; Eigentümerstruktur ; Landesgröße ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Mittermaier, Ferdinand
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
• (where): München
• (when): 2007

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.2031
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104228
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-2031-4
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET