Subsidy Competition and the Role of Firm Ownership

Arbeitspapier

This paper addresses the role that foreign vs. domestic ownership of companies plays for governments in asymmetric countries' competition for a multinational's subsidiary. I argue that equilibrium subsidies as well as a foreign investor's location decision in policy competition between these countries critically depend on the ownership structure of incumbent firms. This shows that small countries with few national incumbents in an industry may be successful in attracting multinationals.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2007-31

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT) ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: Subsidy competition ; foreign direct investment ; regional location ; Subvention ; Standortpolitik ; Standortwettbewerb ; Multinationales Unternehmen ; Eigentümerstruktur ; Landesgröße ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Mittermaier, Ferdinand
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.2031
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104228
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-2031-4
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ