Arbeitspapier
Entrepreneur-investor information design
I consider an environment in which the entrepreneur generates information about the quality of the projects prior to contracting with the investor. The investor faces a moral hazard problem, since the entrepreneur may divert the funding for private consumption. When the investor bargains with the entrepreneur, I find that the efficient amount of information is generated if and only if the bargaining power of the entrepreneur is high enough. I interpret this result in terms of investors' concentration, competitiveness, and generosity measures. I show that the investor prefers a non-absolute bargaining power when the project costs are high enough.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 20-14
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Unternehmer
Investor Relations
Verhandlungsmacht
Investitionsentscheidung
Informationsökonomik
Moral Hazard
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Muratov, Oleg
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bern, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Bern
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Muratov, Oleg
- University of Bern, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2020
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