Arbeitspapier
Commitment Problems and War in International Bargaining
In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that commitment problems per se are not necessarily a cause of war even if the relative bargaining position changes substantially.
- ISBN
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978-3-86788-458-7
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 403
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
- Subject
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bargaining
commitment problems
shifts in power
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Amann, Erwin
Leonhardt, Nadine
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
- (where)
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Essen
- (when)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.4419/86788458
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Amann, Erwin
- Leonhardt, Nadine
- Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Time of origin
- 2013
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Commitment Problems and War in International Bargaining
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Strikes and Deadline Effects in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment
Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem
Limit Solutions for Finite Horizon Bargaining Problems
Dividing justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims
Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility
Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Infonnation
Commitment in Alternating Offers Bargaining
Commitment and conflict in multilateral bargaining
Commitment Problems and War in International Bargaining
An experiment on the winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism
Strikes and Deadline Effects in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment
Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem
Limit Solutions for Finite Horizon Bargaining Problems
Dividing justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims
Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility