Arbeitspapier
Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free Rider Problem'
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 144
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Groves, Theodore
Ledyard, John
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
-
Evanston, IL
- (when)
-
1976
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Groves, Theodore
- Ledyard, John
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1976
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Free riders play fair
Contests over Public Goods: Evolutionary Stability and the Free-Rider Problem
Members, Joiners, Free-riders, Supporters
Members, Joiners, Free-Riders, Supporters
Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Good: Learning to be a Free Rider
Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games
Rating agents: Scapegoat or free-riders?
Good governance and good aid allocation
Good governance and good aid allocation
Distortionary taxation and the free-rider problem
Punishing Free-Riders : How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods