Arbeitspapier

The impact of labor mobility restrictions on managerial actions: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

This paper examines how labor mobility restrictions such as non-compete clauses in employment contracts affect the incentives and resulting behavior of employees. Using the investment industry as a testing laboratory, we find that mutual fund managers respond to heightened career concerns due to increased enforceability of non-compete clauses by increasing effort, reducing downside risk, engaging less in tournaments, making their portfolios similar to the portfolios of their benchmarks or peers, and increasing window-dressing. These concerns are, however, moderated by the presence of more developed internal labor markets, which allow managers to substitute restricted across-family mobility with within-family mobility.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CFR Working Paper ; No. 18-01

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cici, Gjergji
Hendriock, Mario
Kempf, Alexander
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
(where)
Cologne
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cici, Gjergji
  • Hendriock, Mario
  • Kempf, Alexander
  • University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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