Arbeitspapier
Employment risk, compensation incentives and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry
We examine the influence on managerial risk taking of incentives due to employment risk and due to compensation. Our empirical investigation of the risk taking behavior of mutual fund managers indicates that managerial risk taking crucially depends on the relative importance of these incentives. When employment risk is more important than compensation incentives, fund managers with a poor midyear performance tend to decrease risk relative to leading managers to prevent potential job loss. When employment risk is low, compensation incentives become more relevant and fund managers with a poor midyear performance increase risk to catch up with the midyear winners.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CFR Working Paper ; No. 07-02
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
- Thema
-
Managerial Risk Taking
Employment Risk
Compensation Incentives
Mutual Funds
Restrictions
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kempf, Alexander
Ruenzi, Stefan
Thiele, Tanja
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
- (wo)
-
Cologne
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kempf, Alexander
- Ruenzi, Stefan
- Thiele, Tanja
- University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
Entstanden
- 2008