Arbeitspapier

Employment risk, compensation incentives and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

We examine the influence on managerial risk taking of incentives due to employment risk and due to compensation. Our empirical investigation of the risk taking behavior of mutual fund managers indicates that managerial risk taking crucially depends on the relative importance of these incentives. When employment risk is more important than compensation incentives, fund managers with a poor midyear performance tend to decrease risk relative to leading managers to prevent potential job loss. When employment risk is low, compensation incentives become more relevant and fund managers with a poor midyear performance increase risk to catch up with the midyear winners.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CFR Working Paper ; No. 07-02

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Thema
Managerial Risk Taking
Employment Risk
Compensation Incentives
Mutual Funds
Restrictions

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kempf, Alexander
Ruenzi, Stefan
Thiele, Tanja
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
(wo)
Cologne
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kempf, Alexander
  • Ruenzi, Stefan
  • Thiele, Tanja
  • University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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