Arbeitspapier
Managerial multitasking in the mutual fund industry
We examine the determinants and consequences of mutual fund managers simultaneously managing multiple funds. Well-performing managers multitask by taking over poorly performing funds or launching new funds. Subsequent to multitasking, funds run by managers prior to multitasking (i.e., incumbent funds) experience performance deterioration while the performance of the acquired funds improves. Multitasking increases the assets of fund companies but results in a wealth transfer from shareholders of the incumbent funds to those of the funds the managers take over. Multitasking arrangements are terminated when investors recognize the associated agency problem and withdraw their capital from the incumbent funds.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CFR Working Paper ; No. 13-10 [rev.]
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
- Thema
-
Multitasking
Fund Performance
Fund Flows
Agency Problems
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Agarwal, Vikas
Ma, Linlin
Mullally, Kevin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
- (wo)
-
Cologne
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Agarwal, Vikas
- Ma, Linlin
- Mullally, Kevin
- University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
Entstanden
- 2015