Arbeitspapier

Managerial multitasking in the mutual fund industry

We examine the determinants and consequences of mutual fund managers simultaneously managing multiple funds. Well-performing managers multitask by taking over poorly performing funds or launching new funds. Subsequent to multitasking, funds run by managers prior to multitasking (i.e., incumbent funds) experience performance deterioration while the performance of the acquired funds improves. Multitasking increases the assets of fund companies but results in a wealth transfer from shareholders of the incumbent funds to those of the funds the managers take over. Multitasking arrangements are terminated when investors recognize the associated agency problem and withdraw their capital from the incumbent funds.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CFR Working Paper ; No. 13-10 [rev.]

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
Thema
Multitasking
Fund Performance
Fund Flows
Agency Problems

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Agarwal, Vikas
Ma, Linlin
Mullally, Kevin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
(wo)
Cologne
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Agarwal, Vikas
  • Ma, Linlin
  • Mullally, Kevin
  • University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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