Arbeitspapier

Veto Players, intertemporal interactions and policy adaptability: How do political institutions work?

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Veto player theory argues that a higher number of veto players lowers the likelihood of change; in turn, policies that do not change help to sustain commitments but may prevent adaptation to changing circumstances. This paper challenges that claim of veto player theory by arguing that policy stability does not necessarily mean lower policy adaptability. If policymaking takes place over time with actors interacting repeatedly, more cooperative polities might be able to achieve both objectives at once, and a higher number of veto players might even favor intertemporal cooperation. The paper presents a simple formalization of the argument and some supportive cross-national empirical evidence.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 645

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Scartascini, Carlos
Stein, Ernesto
Tommasi, Mariano
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department
(where)
Washington, DC
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Scartascini, Carlos
  • Stein, Ernesto
  • Tommasi, Mariano
  • Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department

Time of origin

  • 2008

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