Why does Centralisation fail to internalise Policy Externalities?

Arbeitspapier

We provide an explanation why centralisation of political decision makingresults in overspending in some policy domains, whereas too low spending persists in others.We study a model in which delegates from jurisdictions bargain over local public goods provision.If all of the costs of public goods are shared through a common budget, policy makersdelegate bargaining to ‘public good lovers’, resulting in overprovision of public goods. If asufficiently large part of the costs can not be shared, underprovision persists because policymakers delegate bargaining to ‘conservatives’. We derive financing rules that eliminate theincentives for strategic delegation.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 02-056/3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; Public Goods
• Thema: Centralised decision making ; strategic delegation ; financing rules. ; Lokale öffentliche Güter ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Zentralisierung ; Dezentralisierung ; Pareto-Optimum ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dur, Robert A.J. ; Roelfsema, Hein J.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85876
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ