Arbeitspapier
Long-term commitment and cooperation
We study how the willingness to enter long-term bilateral relationships affects cooperation even when parties have little information about each other, ex ante, and cooperation is otherwise unenforceable. We experimentally investigate a finitely-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, allowing players to endogenously select interaction durations. Consistent with prior research, longer interactions facilitate cooperation. However, many individuals avoid long-term commitment, with uncooperative types less likely to commit than conditional cooperators. Endogenously chosen long-term commitment yields higher cooperation rates (98% in one condition) than exogenously imposed commitment. Thus, the willingness to enter into long-term relationships provides a means for fostering - and screening for - efficient cooperation.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 130
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Subject
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Repeated games
cooperation
voluntary commitment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Schneider, Frédéric
Weber, Roberto A.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Zurich
- (when)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-81435
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schneider, Frédéric
- Weber, Roberto A.
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2013
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