Arbeitspapier
Long-term relationship bargaining
We analyze a bargaining model where there is a long-term relationship between a seller and a buyer and there is bargaining over a sequence of surpluses that arrives at fixed points in time. Markov Perfect Equilibria are analyzed and equilibrium payoffs characterized. The transfers between the players can be described as a first-order system of difference equations. Payoffs depend on both current and future surpluses. Future surpluses are important partly because the risk of separation leads to the loss of surplus today and in the future and partly because delay without separation can last into future periods. We also find conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibria with immediate agreement.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series ; No. 266
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Thema
-
bargaining
long term relationship
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Westermark, Andreas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sveriges Riksbank
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Westermark, Andreas
- Sveriges Riksbank
Entstanden
- 2013