Arbeitspapier

Long-term relationship bargaining

We analyze a bargaining model where there is a long-term relationship between a seller and a buyer and there is bargaining over a sequence of surpluses that arrives at fixed points in time. Markov Perfect Equilibria are analyzed and equilibrium payoffs characterized. The transfers between the players can be described as a first-order system of difference equations. Payoffs depend on both current and future surpluses. Future surpluses are important partly because the risk of separation leads to the loss of surplus today and in the future and partly because delay without separation can last into future periods. We also find conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibria with immediate agreement.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series ; No. 266

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Thema
bargaining
long term relationship

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Westermark, Andreas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sveriges Riksbank
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Westermark, Andreas
  • Sveriges Riksbank

Entstanden

  • 2013

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