Arbeitspapier

Long-term commitment and cooperation

We study how the willingness to enter long-term bilateral relationships affects cooperation even when parties have little information about each other, ex ante, and cooperation is otherwise unenforceable. We experimentally investigate a finitely-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, allowing players to endogenously select interaction durations. Consistent with prior research, longer interactions facilitate cooperation. However, many individuals avoid long-term commitment, with uncooperative types less likely to commit than conditional cooperators. Endogenously chosen long-term commitment yields higher cooperation rates (98% in one condition) than exogenously imposed commitment. Thus, the willingness to enter into long-term relationships provides a means for fostering - and screening for - efficient cooperation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 130

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
Repeated games
cooperation
voluntary commitment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schneider, Frédéric
Weber, Roberto A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2013

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-81435
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schneider, Frédéric
  • Weber, Roberto A.
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2013

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