Arbeitspapier

Conservation by Lending

This project analyzes how a principal can motivate an agent to conserve rather than exploit a depletable resource. This dynamic problem is relevant for tropical deforestation as well as for other environmental problems. It is shown that the smaller is the agent's discount factor (e.g., because of political instability), the more the principal benefits from debt-for-nature contracts compared to flow payments (in return for lower deforestation). The debt-for-nature contract combines a loan to the agent with repayments that are contingent on the forest cover.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10533

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
environmental conservation
sovereign debt
sustainability-linked bonds
default
hyperbolic discounting
time inconsistency

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Harstad, Bård
Storesletten, Kjetil
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2023

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Harstad, Bård
  • Storesletten, Kjetil
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2023

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