Arbeitspapier

Asset-Based Lending

Asset-based lending, the supply of loans based on floating collateral, is an important source of funding for small firms. We analyze the effect of competition on asset-based loan markets on interest rate distributions and the mobility of small firms. Close monitoring of collateral by lenders results in an informational advantage for the incumbent lender and third-degree price discrimination. We find that adverse selection results in a unique equilibrium in which lenders randomize interest rates and firms switch lender with positive probability. Increased competition between lenders does not benefit firms through lower expected interest rates, neither does it improve their mobility.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2019-032/VII

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: Financial Markets
Subject
asset-based lending
floating collateral
adverse selection

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bijkerk, Suzanne H.
de Vries, Casper G.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2019

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bijkerk, Suzanne H.
  • de Vries, Casper G.
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2019

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