Arbeitspapier
Conservation by Lending
This project analyzes how a principal can motivate an agent to conserve rather than exploit a depletable resource. This dynamic problem is relevant for tropical deforestation as well as for other environmental problems. It is shown that the smaller is the agent's discount factor (e.g., because of political instability), the more the principal benefits from debt-for-nature contracts compared to flow payments (in return for lower deforestation). The debt-for-nature contract combines a loan to the agent with repayments that are contingent on the forest cover.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10533
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
environmental conservation
sovereign debt
sustainability-linked bonds
default
hyperbolic discounting
time inconsistency
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Harstad, Bård
Storesletten, Kjetil
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2023
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Harstad, Bård
- Storesletten, Kjetil
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2023