Arbeitspapier

Conservation by Lending

This project analyzes how a principal can motivate an agent to conserve rather than exploit a depletable resource. This dynamic problem is relevant for tropical deforestation as well as for other environmental problems. It is shown that the smaller is the agent's discount factor (e.g., because of political instability), the more the principal benefits from debt-for-nature contracts compared to flow payments (in return for lower deforestation). The debt-for-nature contract combines a loan to the agent with repayments that are contingent on the forest cover.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10533

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
environmental conservation
sovereign debt
sustainability-linked bonds
default
hyperbolic discounting
time inconsistency

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Harstad, Bård
Storesletten, Kjetil
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2023

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Harstad, Bård
  • Storesletten, Kjetil
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2023

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