Strategic Power Revisited

Arbeitspapier

Traditional power indices ignore preferences and strategic interaction. Equilibrium analysis of particular non-cooperative decision procedures is unsuitable for normative analysis and assumes typically unavailable information. These points drive a lingering debate about the right approach to power analysis. A unified framework that works both sides of the street is developed here. It rests on a notion of a posteriori power which formalizes players' marginal impact to outcomes in cooperative and non-cooperative games, for strategic interaction and purely random behaviour. Taking expectations with respect to preferences, actions, and procedures then defines a meaningful a priori measure. Established indices turn out to be special cases.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 736

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: power indices ; spatial voting ; equilibrium analysis ; decision procedures

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Napel, Stefan ; Widgrén, Mika
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76103
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET