Arbeitspapier
Strategic Power Revisited
Traditional power indices ignore preferences and strategic interaction. Equilibrium analysis of particular non-cooperative decision procedures is unsuitable for normative analysis and assumes typically unavailable information. These points drive a lingering debate about the right approach to power analysis. A unified framework that works both sides of the street is developed here. It rests on a notion of a posteriori power which formalizes players' marginal impact to outcomes in cooperative and non-cooperative games, for strategic interaction and purely random behaviour. Taking expectations with respect to preferences, actions, and procedures then defines a meaningful a priori measure. Established indices turn out to be special cases.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 736
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
power indices
spatial voting
equilibrium analysis
decision procedures
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Napel, Stefan
Widgrén, Mika
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Napel, Stefan
- Widgrén, Mika
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2002
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