Arbeitspapier
The Economics of First-Contract Mediation
This paper provides an economic foundation for non-binding mediation to stimulate first collective bargaining agreements, as implemented in British Columbia since 1993. We show that the outcome of first-contract mediation is Pareto efficient and proves immune to the insider-outsider problem of underhiring. We also demonstrate that equilibrium wages and profits under mediation coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 13-096/VII
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
Contract Law
- Thema
-
BC first-contract model
mediation
collective bargaining
union
non-binding contract
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dobbelaere, Sabien
Luttens, Roland Iwan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dobbelaere, Sabien
- Luttens, Roland Iwan
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2013
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