Arbeitspapier

Incomplete Contract and Divisional Structures

In this paper we want to analyze the internal divisional structure within an organi-zation in the framework of incomplete contract theory. We use the framework of Aghionand Tirole (1997) and define the managerial control structure as sequence of search.A key feature of this paper which differentiate it from other works in the literature isthat we add add an ex post bargaining phase in which the managers can agree on theproject which maximize their joint private benefit. Our model shows the share of co-operative surplus the managers can get from bargaining and their default pay off playsa key role in determining their search effort. When there is no spill over effect betweenthe agents' effort, internal separation is always dominated by internal integration withcontrol right assigned to the agent (manager) with high interest congruence with theprincipal (head quarter). When there are synergy effect and setup cost during integra-tion, the principal need to consider the cost-benefit trade offs as Riyanto (2000) suggests.But more importantly, the optimal divisional structure depends heavily on whether thebargaining is interest congruence enhancing (increase the interest congruence betweenagents and the principal) or destroying (decrease the interest congruence).

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 09-075/1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Subject
organizational form
divisional structure
incomplete contract
bargaining
Unternehmensorganisation
Organisationsstruktur
Verhalten in Organisationen
Unvollständiger Vertrag
Verhandlungstheorie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bao, Te
Wang, Yongqin
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bao, Te
  • Wang, Yongqin
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2009

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