Arbeitspapier

Wage independence in symmetric oligopolistic industries

This paper provides sufficient conditions under which the negotiated wage in unionized oligopolistic industries with centralized negotiations is independent of a number of product market features (such as the number of firms, the degree of product substitutability, or the type of market competition). This wage independence property is shown to hold in a broad class of industry specifications widely-used in the literature, both when negotiations are conducted over wages alone (Right-to-Manage), and over wages and employment (Efficient Bargains). In particular, it holds for the Dixit-Stiglitz preference-for-diversity model, the symmetric linear demands-linear one factor (labor) technology model, and the constant elasticity demand and cost functions model. In these models the negotiated wage is independent of the bargaining institution, too. Unions are then better-off as the market becomes more competitive since aggregate employment increases.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2.1997

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Thema
Lohn
Oligopol
Tarifpolitik
Theorie der Unternehmung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dhillon, Amrita
Petrakis, Emmanuel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
1997

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dhillon, Amrita
  • Petrakis, Emmanuel
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 1997

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