Arbeitspapier

Externalities and the Erosion of Trust

We present a theory linking political and social trust to explain trust erosion in modern societies. Individuals disagree on the seriousness of an externality problem, which leads to diverging policy opinions on how to solve it. This heterogeneity has two important effects on trust. First, disappointment with the policy rule enacted by the government breeds institutional distrust. Individuals that are more worried blame the government because the rule is too lenient. The less worried blame it even more because it is too intrusive. Second, as the rule also shapes individuals' notion of civic behavior, it drives a wedge between what an individual expects from others and their actual behavior. This fuels social distrust. The more individuals are worried, the more they distrust others that are not complying with the rules. Our experimental survey conducted in four European countries shows how these trust dynamics came to the surface during the Covid-19 pandemic. Once led to think intensely about the virus, lower institutional trust was reported predominantly by respondents that were less worried about the virus, whereas social trust declined (more) for worried individuals. We lastly find that support for the welfare state erodes alongside sliding trust levels.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10474

Classification
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
Economywide Country Studies: Europe
Subject
social trust
institutional trust
heterogeneity
externalities
regulation
survey experiment
Covid-19
climate change
welfare
taxation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Daniele, Gianmarco
Martinangeli, Andrea F.M.
Passarelli, Francesco
Sas, Willem
Windsteiger, Lisa
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2023

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Daniele, Gianmarco
  • Martinangeli, Andrea F.M.
  • Passarelli, Francesco
  • Sas, Willem
  • Windsteiger, Lisa
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2023

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