Arbeitspapier

Full transparency of politicians' actions does not increase the quality of political representation

We identify the impact of transparency in political decision -making on the quality of political representation with a difference- in-difference strategy. The quality of political representation is measured by observed divergence of parliamentary decisions from revealed voter preferences on the very same issues. Full transparency of votes of individual politicians does not decrease divergence from voter preferences.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2013-17

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Thema
Transparency
quality of political decisions
representation
parliament
individual votes
referenda

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Stadelmann, David
Portmann, Marco
Eichenberger, Reiner
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
(wo)
Zürich
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Stadelmann, David
  • Portmann, Marco
  • Eichenberger, Reiner
  • Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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