Arbeitspapier

Full transparency of politicians' actions does not increase the quality of political representation

We identify the impact of transparency in political decision -making on the quality of political representation with a difference- in-difference strategy. The quality of political representation is measured by observed divergence of parliamentary decisions from revealed voter preferences on the very same issues. Full transparency of votes of individual politicians does not decrease divergence from voter preferences.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2013-17

Classification
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Subject
Transparency
quality of political decisions
representation
parliament
individual votes
referenda

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Stadelmann, David
Portmann, Marco
Eichenberger, Reiner
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
(where)
Zürich
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Stadelmann, David
  • Portmann, Marco
  • Eichenberger, Reiner
  • Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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