Arbeitspapier

Intergovernmental Grants as a Tactical Instrument: Some Empirical Evidence from Swedish Municipalities

Are grants to Swedish municipalities tactical? In this essay, I derive testable implications from a theoretical voting model and test these on a panel of 255 Swedish municipalities, 1981 - 1995. In order to decide which regions that are politically powerful, both election results, and survey data from the Swedish election studies are used. The results, although somewhat ambiguous, support the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants are used in order to win votes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1999:10

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Thema
Political economy
tactical redistribution
intergovernmental grants
Kommunaler Finanzausgleich
Neue politische Ökonomie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Johansson, Eva
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Uppsala
(wann)
2001

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-2456
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Johansson, Eva
  • Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2001

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