Arbeitspapier

Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power

In their role as agenda setters and implementers of political decisions, bureaucrats potentially have the power to influence decisions in their own favor. It is however difficult to empirically test whether bureaucrats actually are involved in such actions. In this paper we suggest and apply a new way of testing the hypothesis that bureaucrats can and do in fact affect policy to their own benefit. Making use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system, we estimate causal effects of intergovernmental grants on different types of personnel employed by the local governments. On the margin, we find a large, positive effect of grants on the number of bureaucrats in the central administration, but no effects on the number of personnel in other important sectors run by the local government (child care, schools and elderly care). These results support the view that bureaucrats are able to, and do indeed, affect the allocation of grants within municipalities to support own goals.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2008:17

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
Public Sector Labor Markets
Thema
fiscal federalism
grants
bureaucrats
rent seeking
discontinuity analysis
Finanzföderalismus
Finanzausgleich
Kommunalverwaltung
Allokation
Rent Seeking
Schweden

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dahlberg, Matz
Lundqvist, Heléne
Mörk, Eva
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)
(wo)
Uppsala
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dahlberg, Matz
  • Lundqvist, Heléne
  • Mörk, Eva
  • Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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