Artikel
Preliminary investigations for better monitoring: Learning in repeated insurance audits
Audit mechanisms frequently take place in the context of repeated relationships between auditor and auditee. This paper focuses attention on the insurance fraud problem in a setting where insurers repeatedly verify claims satisfied by service providers (e.g., affiliated car repairers or members of managed care networks). We highlight a learning bias that leads insurers to over-audit service providers at the beginning of their relationship. The paper builds a bridge between the literature on optimal audit in insurance and the exploitation/exploration trade-off in multi-armed bandit problems.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Risks ; ISSN: 2227-9091 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-22 ; Basel: MDPI
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Thema
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ex-post moral hazard
insurance fraud
optimal auditing
learning
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Aboutajdine, Reda
Picard, Pierre
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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MDPI
- (wo)
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Basel
- (wann)
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2018
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/risks6010015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Aboutajdine, Reda
- Picard, Pierre
- MDPI
Entstanden
- 2018