On the Use of Information in Repeated Insurance Markets

Arbeitspapier

We analyze the use of information in a repeated oligopolistic insurance market. To sustain collusion, insurance companies might refrain from changing their pricing schedules even if new information about risks becomes available. We therefore provide an explanation for the existence of unused observables that is information which

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 280

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: repeated games ; insurance markets ; oligopoly ; unused observables

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kesternich, Iris ; Schumacher, Heiner
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2009

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13274
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94102
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13274-1
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET