Artikel

Preliminary investigations for better monitoring: Learning in repeated insurance audits

Audit mechanisms frequently take place in the context of repeated relationships between auditor and auditee. This paper focuses attention on the insurance fraud problem in a setting where insurers repeatedly verify claims satisfied by service providers (e.g., affiliated car repairers or members of managed care networks). We highlight a learning bias that leads insurers to over-audit service providers at the beginning of their relationship. The paper builds a bridge between the literature on optimal audit in insurance and the exploitation/exploration trade-off in multi-armed bandit problems.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Risks ; ISSN: 2227-9091 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-22 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
ex-post moral hazard
insurance fraud
optimal auditing
learning

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Aboutajdine, Reda
Picard, Pierre
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2018

DOI
doi:10.3390/risks6010015
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Aboutajdine, Reda
  • Picard, Pierre
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2018

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