Artikel
Preliminary investigations for better monitoring: Learning in repeated insurance audits
Audit mechanisms frequently take place in the context of repeated relationships between auditor and auditee. This paper focuses attention on the insurance fraud problem in a setting where insurers repeatedly verify claims satisfied by service providers (e.g., affiliated car repairers or members of managed care networks). We highlight a learning bias that leads insurers to over-audit service providers at the beginning of their relationship. The paper builds a bridge between the literature on optimal audit in insurance and the exploitation/exploration trade-off in multi-armed bandit problems.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Risks ; ISSN: 2227-9091 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-22 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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ex-post moral hazard
insurance fraud
optimal auditing
learning
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Aboutajdine, Reda
Picard, Pierre
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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MDPI
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2018
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/risks6010015
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Aboutajdine, Reda
- Picard, Pierre
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2018