Arbeitspapier
Financial disclosure and the Board: A case for non-independent directors
In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. The conventional wisdom is that director independence is an essential factor in improving the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates expertise to independence. We argue that effective certification may require firm-specific expertise, in particular for intangible-intensive business models. However, this latter form of expertise is negatively related to independence as it is commonly measured and evaluated. Accordingly, there exists an optimal share of independent directors for each company, related to the level of intangible resources.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 689
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Business Economics
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Accounting
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Biondi, Yuri
Giannoccolo, Pierpaolo
Reberioux, Antoine
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
2010
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4553
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Biondi, Yuri
- Giannoccolo, Pierpaolo
- Reberioux, Antoine
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2010
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