Lobbying against environmental regulation vs. lobbying for loopholes

Arbeitspapier

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the competitor. We determine the lobbying equilibrium and discuss the resulting emission level. In many cases, a higher effectiveness of private lobbying is detrimental for firms and beneficial for environmental quality, as it induces firms to turn towards excessive amounts of relatively unproductive private lobbying.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 0301

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Economics of Regulation
• Subject: Environmental Regulation ; Pollution Standards ; Interest Groups ; Lobbying ; Policy Making ; Umweltpolitik ; Interessenpolitik ; Interessenvertretung ; Theorie ; Politische Willensbildung

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Polk, Andreas ; Schmutzler, Armin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute
• (where): Zurich
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76214
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET